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DETECTING MULTIPLE AUTHORSHIP OF UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT LEGAL DECISIONS USING FUNCTION
WORDS
By Jeffrey S. Rosenthal and Albert H. Yoon
University of Toronto
This paper uses statistical analysis of function words used in le-
gal judgments written by United States Supreme Court justices, to
determine which justices have the most variable writing style (which
may indicated greater reliance on their law clerks when writing opin-
ions), and also the extent to which different justices’ writing styles
are distinguishable from each other.
1. Introduction. This paper describes various statistical analyses per-
formed on the texts of judicial opinions written by United States Supreme
Court (USSC) justices.
Our primary motivation is to attempt to use textual analysis to explore
issues of authorship. With respect to the USSC, we are interested in the
extent to which justices rely on their clerks when writing opinions. Accord-
ing to legal scholar and jurist Richard A. Posner, “Americans. . . could not
care less whether Supreme Court justices or any other judges write their
own opinions or have their clerks write them, provided the judges decide
the outcome” [Posner (1996), page 143]. While reasonable minds may dis-
agree with Posner on either positive or normative grounds, it is clear that
the content of judicial opinions matter, particularly at the USSC. Lower
courts are bound by both the holding and the reasoning of USSC opinions,
and litigants—actual and prospective—act in the shadow of these opinions
[Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979)].
The issue of judicial authorship is important from an institutional and
policy perspective. At the federal level, the expansion in the number of
cases has significantly outpaced the increase in authorized judgeships. This
trend is most pronounced at the USSC, where over the past fifty years the
court’s caseload has steadily increased while the number of justices—and
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law clerks—has remained constant. Justices are asked to handle more work
with the same resources. Given the public and Congressional scrutiny given
to the selection of USSC nominees [Carter (1994)], it is daunting to consider
that much of the Court’s work is done by “twenty-five-year-old law clerks
fresh out of law school” [Posner (1986), page 567].
Given these increased demands, and heterogeneity in justices’ ability and
effort, one would expect that justices differ in how they manage their work-
load. Some justices respond, as many have, by joining the “cert pool,” where
justices work collectively to evaluate which cases to grant certiorari [Ward
and Weiden (2006), page 117]. Some may delegate more of opinion writ-
ing, the primary output from the Court, to their law clerks. The degree to
which the latter has occurred remains a topic of intense debate by journal-
ists and scholars alike [Woodward and Armstrong (1979); Lazarus (1998);
Toobin (2007)].
This debate has been motivated in part by the fact that justices, as Article
III judges, enjoy lifetime tenure. Critics of lifetime tenure contend that jus-
tices often serve well beyond their productive years [Garrow (2000); Calbresi
and Lindgren (2006)]. If true, one manifestation would likely be increased
delegation of work to law clerks as justices’ ability and desire to do the
work diminishes over time. Our methodology provides a credible statisti-
cal approach to examine the relationship between justices and their clerks,
specifically how justices vary, both with respect to one another and over the
court of their tenure on the USSC.
Our central intuition is that the greater the delegation in the opinion-
writing process, the more heterogeneous the writing style. At the extremes,
a justice who wrote his own opinions would presumptively have a more
distinct writing style than another justice who relied heavily on his law
clerks. This view is supported by recent scholarship analyzing justices’ draft
opinions where available, finding that a justice who was more involved in the
opinion-writing process produced more textually consistent opinions than
a justice who delegated more of the work to his clerks [Wahlbeck et al.
(2002), page 172]. The institutional design of USSC clerkships provides an
additional exogenous mechanism to test this hypothesis: USSC clerkships are
usually for a single term, from October through August of the subsequent
year. Accordingly, the cohort for law clerks changes in predictable fashion,
allowing an examination of justices’ writing style within and across terms.
Although this paper focuses on statistical methodology, the question of
judicial authorship is an important one in both political science and law.
USSC opinions reflect a principal–agent relationship between the justices
and their clerks. As with any principal–agent relationship, the degrees to
which the clerks’ interests correspond with the justices’ depend on their
incentives and degree of oversight. But to even approach this question re-
quires first a more complete understanding of judicial authorship. While it
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may be possible to tackle this assignment by reading every Supreme Court
opinion, our discussions with current USSC scholars suggest that differences
in writing variability across justices may be too subtle to discern manually.
Our paper provides a more systematic approach. [In a different direction,
scholars have recently taken a textual analysis approach to the USSC in the
context of oral argument; Hawes, Lin and Resnik (2009).]
For example, it is believed that within the current USSC, certain justices
[e.g., Scalia; see Lazarus (1998), page 271] primarily write their own legal
decisions, while others [e.g., Kennedy; see Lazarus (1998), page 274] rely
more on their law clerks to do much of the writing. While anecdotes abound
on these claims [Peppers (2006); Ward and Weiden (2006)], there are few
hard facts about this and it is mostly a matter of speculation.
We attempt to verify this hypothesis by measuring the variability of writ-
ing style of the majority opinions written by various justices. We find, us-
ing the Kennedy–Scalia example, that Kennedy opinions have significantly
greater variability than do those by Scalia, measured using various statistics
involving the frequencies of various function words (as described below). Fur-
thermore, using a bootstrap approach, we confirm that these differences are
statistically significant at the 5% level. Given our assumption that greater
reliance on clerks produces greater variability of writing style, this conclu-
sion would appear to provide compelling evidence that Kennedy does indeed
get more writing assistance from law clerks than does Scalia. We similarly
find that Stevens and Souter have significantly more variability than Scalia,
while Rehnquist and Breyer and Thomas have significantly less variability
than Kennedy.
Our secondary motivation is to attempt to identify authorship, solely by
use of word frequencies. Our informal enquiries with USSC constitutional
scholars indicate that they do not believe they are able to do this. Never-
theless, in this paper we consider various approaches (naive Bayes classifier,
linear classifier), and show using a cross-validation approach that such al-
gorithms can indeed predict authorship in pairwise comparisons with accu-
racy approaching 90%. While this determination is superfluous for authored
opinions, it does provide a clear measure of the extent to which justices have
identifiably distinct writing styles from one another. Moreover, our approach
has other relevant applications, such as identifying the likely author for per
curiam opinions (for which no justice is listed as the author).
Our methodology thus appears to provide useful methods both for de-
termining multiple authorship and for identifying the recorded authorship,
solely using function words—at least for USSC decisions (and perhaps be-
yond). Our analysis required writing extensive software, which is freely avail-
able [Rosenthal (2009)] for purposes of reproducing or extending our results.
Further details are given herein.
4 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
1.1. Background on the United States Supreme Court. The USSC is the
highest court in the United States, providing the final word on all federal
issues of constitutional and statutory law. It has a predominantly discre-
tionary docket, granting certiorari only for “cases involving unsettled ques-
tions of federal constitutional or statutory law of general interest” [Rehnquist
(2001), page 238]. While the USSC is not unique in issuing opinions or creat-
ing precedent, its position at the apex of the judicial hierarchy ensures that
practitioners, legal scholars, and law students closely scrutinize its opinions.
Each year the Court receives thousands of petitions for certiorari (re-
quests to hear the case), for which it decides which cases to hear, and issue
opinions. In the 2008–2009 term, for example, the Court received 8966 cert
petitions, heard oral argument for 87 cases, and issued 86 opinions [Judicial
Business of the United States Courts (2009), Table A1]. These figures reflect
a historical trend in which the caseload demands of the Court has steadily
increased.
The workload is considerable. Unlike the executive and legislative branches
of the federal government, the USSC is administratively lean. The court it-
self consists of only nine justices. The chambers of each justice typically
consist of one secretary and four law clerks.
Justices routinely serve on the USSC well past typical retirement age or
after they vest in their pension (which usually occurs at age 65), often leaving
only due to death or illness. Perhaps in part due to the Court’s tradition
of longevity and hard work, Americans consistently rank the USSC as the
most trusted branch of government [Jamieson and Hennessy (2007)]. Justice
Louis Brandeis once commented, “[t]he reason the public thinks so much of
the Justices of the Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people
in Washington who do their own work” [O’Brien (1986), pages 12–13].
At the same time, the USSC remains one of the least understood branches.
Unlike Congress, the USSC deliberates in private. The deliberations result
in a single public document: the opinion itself. Accordingly, the process by
which the USSC produces each opinion remains largely unknown. Prior to
the 1950s, justices performed most of the substantive requirements of the
job, including writing opinions [Peppers (2006), page 208], while law clerks
performed mostly administrative tasks. As the job demands increased over
time, however, without a corresponding increase in the number of justices,
justices relied more on law clerks to prepare certiorari and oral argument
memos, as well as draft and edit opinions [Peppers (2006), page 151]. While
the prestige of a Supreme Court law clerkship is well accepted within legal
circles [Kozinski (1999)], the clerks’ contribution to their respective jus-
tices remains largely anecdotal [Peppers (2006); Ward and Weiden (2006);
Lazarus (1998); Woodward and Armstrong (1979)]. Some accounts of the
USSC law clerks directly challenge Brandeis’s claim. Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall, when told that his view of the right to privacy conflicted with one of
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Table 1
The 63 function words used in the present study
a, all, also, an, and, any, are, as, at, be, been, but, by, can, do, down, even, for, from,
had, has, have, her, his, if, in, into, is, it, its, may,more, must, no, not, now, of, on,
one, only, or, our, so, some, such, than, that, the, their, then, there, things, this, to,
up, was, were, what, when, which, who, with, would
his earlier opinions, allegedly replied, “That’s not my opinion, that’s the
opinion of [a clerk from the prior term]” [Woodward and Armstrong (1979),
page 238]. Overall, the anecdotal evidence suggests that justices vary in their
reliance on law clerks in the drafting and editing of opinions.
1.2. Statistical analysis via function words. Stylometry, the statistical
analysis of texts, has a long history, including applications to the famous
Shakespeare authorship question [see, e.g., Seletsky, Huang and Henderson-
Frost (2007); Burns (2006); Wikipedia (2009), though much of the investiga-
tion has involved historical and other nonstatistical methods], the Federalist
Papers [Mosteller and Wallace (1964)], and Ronald Reagan’s radio addresses
[Airoldi et al. (2006, 2007)].
One challenge with statistical textual analysis is separating those writ-
ing features pertaining to writing style, from those pertaining to specific
subject matter content. To deal with this, a number of authors [e.g., Fries
(1952); Miller, Newman and Friedman (1958); Mosteller and Wallace (1964);
Airoldi et al. (2006); Wyatt (1980); Argamon and Levitan (2005); see also
the lengthy bibliography in Mosteller and Wallace (1964)] have made ex-
tensive use of so-called function words, that is, words such as all, have, not
and than, whose usage frequencies are thought to be largely independent of
the subject matter under discussion. Previous studies [Wyatt (1980); Arg-
amon and Levitan (2005)] have found these function words to be of some
use, albeit limited, in determining authorship of disputed writings. And, as
summarized by Madigan et al. (2005), “The stylometry literature has long
considered function words to be topic-free in the sense that the relative fre-
quency with which an author uses, for example, “with,” should be the same
regardless of whether the author is describing cooking recipes or the latest
news about the oil futures market.” In any case, such function words appear
to be a useful starting point for content-independent statistical analysis.
In particular, in their study of the Federalist Papers, Mosteller and Wal-
lace [(1964), page 38, Table 2.5-2] produce a list of 70 function words, culled
for their purposes from certain earlier studies [Fries (1952); Miller, Newman
and Friedman (1958)]. This list provides the basis for our statistical analysis,
though to improve stability we eliminated the seven function words (every,
my, shall, should, upon, will, your) that occur with frequency less than 0.001
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in the USSC judgments, leaving us with 63 function words (Table 1). (We
also considered adding while and whilst, which Mosteller and Wallace also
found to be very useful, but they too had frequency less than 0.001 in the
USSC judgments. In any case, our results changed very little upon adding
or removing these few words.)
Of course, it is also possible to consider larger-scale features (e.g., sentence
length, paragraph length, multi-word phrases) and smaller-scale features
(e.g., frequency of commas or semi-colons, or the letter ‘e’) and, indeed, our
software [Rosenthal (2009)] computes some of these quantities as well. How-
ever, we have found that these additional quantities did not greatly improve
our predictive power (since their frequencies tend to be similar for differ-
ent judgments) and, furthermore, it is subtle (due to differing scales) how
best to combine such quantities with function word frequencies into a single
variability measure, so we do not use them here. [This decision is partially
reinforced by Madigan et al. (2005), who tried 13 different feature sets for an
authorship identification problem, and found that function words was tied
for second-lowest error rate, just marginally behind a different “three-letter
suffix” approach.] Hence, for simplicity and to allow for “cleaner” theory, in
the present study we compute using function words only.
1.3. Data acquisition. Our data consisted of the complete text of judg-
ments of the USSC from 1991–2009, as provided by the Cornell Law School
web site [Cornell (2009)]. For consistency, we primarily considered the ma-
jority opinions written by the various USSC justices, though we do briefly
consider dissenting opinions below as well. (While expansive, the Cornell
data source occasionally introduces transcription errors and furthermore ap-
parently does not contain quite every USSC opinion, e.g., those by Justice
O’Connor are apparently missing. We assume, however, that such minor
limitations in the data do not significantly bias our results.)
Although the judgment texts were publicly available [Cornell (2009)], it
was still necessary to download all the data files from the web, convert them
to simple plain-text format, remove extraneous header and footer text, sort
the judgments by authoring justice and by court session, and index all the
judgments by date written. The number of judgments to consider, well over
1000, required writing extensive software [Rosenthal (2009)], consisting of
various C programs together with Unix shell-scripts, to quickly and auto-
matically perform this task.
Using this software, we downloaded and processed and sorted all of the
majority opinion judgments (and also separately the dissenting opinions)
of various USSC justices. To avoid trivialities, judgments containing fewer
than 250 words were systematically excluded. The resulting files were then
used as data for all of our statistical work below.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 7
2. Statistical analyses of word counts. We suppose that our function
words are numbered from j = 1 to j = 63. We further suppose that a given
justice has written judgments numbered from i= 1 to i=K. Let wi be the
total number of words in judgment i, and let cij be the number of times
that function word j appears in judgment i.
2.1. Word fractions. Since judgments can differ considerably in their
length, the raw counts cij by themselves are not particularly meaningful.
One approach is to instead consider the quantities
fij = cij/wi,
representing the fraction of words in judgment i which are function word
j. If the sample standard deviation sd(f1j , f2j, . . . , fKj) is much larger for
one justice than for another, this suggests that the former has a much more
variable writing style.
Unfortunately, this analysis is not entirely independent of such factors as
the length of judgments, the different justices’ different propensities to use
different words, etc. For example, suppose for a given function word j, a
given justice has some fixed unknown propensity pj for using the function
word j, independently for each word of each of their judgments. In this
case, the distribution of the count cij of reference word j in judgment i is
Binomial(wi, pj), so that fij has mean pj and variance pj(1− pj)/wi, which
depend on the individual propensities pj and judgment lengths wi. So, while
we could consider calculating the sum of sample standard deviations
V1 =
63∑
j=1
sd(f1j , f2j, . . . , fKj),
and use that as a measure of the variability of writing style across judgments
of a given justice, such a comparison would not be entirely satisfactory
since it would be influenced by such factors as pj and wi, so it would, for
example, tend to unfairly assign smaller variability to justices who tend to
write shorter decisions.
One approach to overcoming this obstacle is to adjust the fractions fij to
make them less sensitive to pj and wi. Specifically, fij − pj has mean 0 and
variance pj(1− pj)/wi, so this is also approximately true for fij −µj , where
µj =
c1j + c2j + · · ·+ cKj
w1 +w2 + · · ·+wK
is our best estimate of pj . Hence, approximately, the quantity
rij =w
1/2
i (fij − µj)
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has mean 0 and variance pj(1− pj), which is independent of the judgment
length wi, suggesting the refined variability estimator
V2 =
63∑
j=1
sd(r1j , r2j, . . . , rKj).
Since pj(1−pj) still depends on the unknown propensity pj , we could further
refine the variability estimator to
V3 =
63∑
j=1
sd(q1j , q2j, . . . , qKj),
where now
qij =
w
1/2
i (fij − µj)
(µj(1− µj))1/2
have mean 0 and variance approximately 1, independent of both wi and pj .
However, even these refinements are not entirely satisfactory, since the
µj are not perfect estimates of the propensities pj , and it is difficult to
accurately take into account the additional variability from the uncertainty
in the µj . In particular, if pj is quite close to zero (as it often will be), then
dividing by µj might be rather unstable, leading to unreliable results. (In
the most extreme case, if µj = 0, then dividing by µj is undefined; we fix this
by simply omitting all terms with µj = 0 from the sum, but this illustrates
the instability inherent in V3.) So, we now consider an alternative approach.
2.2. A chi-squared approach. Since in our case the counts cij are exact,
while estimates such as µj are inexact, this suggests that we instead use the
chi-squared statistic. Specifically, we consider the value
chisq =
K∑
i=1
63∑
j=0
(cij − eij)
2
eij
,
where again wi is the total number of words in judgment i, and cij is the
number of times that function word j appears in judgment i, and now ci0 =
wi − ci1 − · · · − ciK is the number of words in judgment i which are not
function words, and
eij =wi
(
c1j + c2j + · · ·+ cKj
w1 +w2 + · · ·+wK
)
is the expected number of times that function word j would have appeared
in judgment i under the null hypothesis that the total number c1j + c2j +
· · ·+ cKj of appearances of reference word j were each equally likely to occur
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Table 2
Variability statistics for selected USSC justices
# judgments Words/Judgment V1 V2 V3 V4
Kennedy 147 5331 0.118 8.27 2709.1 4.12
Scalia 156 4536 0.113 7.18 2467.0 3.13
Stevens 148 5996 0.111 7.96 2856.2 3.94
Souter 143 5638 0.111 7.80 2531.0 3.77
Ginsburg 130 4712 0.114 7.49 2926.4 3.66
Thomas 140 3877 0.128 7.64 2669.4 3.55
Breyer 121 3804 0.119 7.06 2538.7 3.31
Rehnquist 127 3743 0.124 7.22 2398.5 3.22
Stevens dissent 205 3202 0.147 6.75 2251.1 2.63
Kennedy dissent 42 3546 0.148 6.49 2229.8 2.51
Scalia dissent 108 3410 0.141 6.64 2083.5 2.46
in any of the total number w1+w2+ · · ·+wK of words in all of the justice’s
K judgments combined.
Under the null hypothesis, the chisq statistic should follow a chi-squared
distribution with (63+1− 1)(K − 1) = 63(K − 1) degrees of freedom, hence
with mean 63(K − 1). (The “+1” arises because of the ci0 terms.) So, divid-
ing this statistic by its null mean, we obtain the new statistic
V4 = chisq/df = chisq/63(K − 1).
The value of chisq/df should be approximately 1 under the null hypothe-
sis, and larger than 1 for writing collections which exhibit greater writing
style variability. In particular, the extent to which chisq/df is larger than
1 appears to be a fairly reliable and robust way to estimate writing style
variability.
In our experiments below, we report values of each of V1, V2, V3 and V4,
but we concentrate primarily on V4 since we feel it is the most stable and
reliable measure and eliminates many of the shortcomings of the other three
quantities.
2.3. Variability results. We developed software [Rosenthal (2009)] to com-
pute each of the above variability statistics V1, V2, V3 and V4 (among other
statistics). We then applied our software to a variety of USSC justices’ judg-
ments. The results are in Table 2. (Unless otherwise specified, the results
are for majority judgments written by that justice. Also, “words/judgment”
means the average number of words per judgment considered.)
Looking at these results, we see that Kennedy does indeed have higher
writing-style variability than does Scalia, by each of the four measures, thus
apparently confirming our original hypothesis (see also the next section re
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statistical significance). The other justices mostly fall in between these ex-
tremes, though Souter and Stevens also have very high variability, while
Breyer and Rehnquist have lower variability.
As for the dissenting judgments, we might expect them to have much
smaller writing variability since they tend to be more focused and also more
likely to be written by the justice alone. This is indeed confirmed by the
measures V2, V3 and V4, but not by V1 which gets tripped up by the fact that
dissents tend to be shorter and V1 does not correct for this. So, this provides
confirmation that dissent judgments tend to have more consistent writing
style, and also further illustrates why V1 is not an appropriate measure of
variability. (By contrast, Thomas has greater variability than Scalia by all
measures, even though his average judgment length is much shorter.)
Remark. Of course, the different Vi are each on a different scale, so it
is meaningless to, for example, compare the value of V1 directly with the
value of V2. It is only meaningful to compare the same variability statistic
(e.g., V4) when computed for different collections of judgments.
Remark. In all cases the value of V4 is much larger than it would be
under the null hypothesis that the function words are truly distributed uni-
formly and randomly. For example, for Scalia, the chisq statistic is equal to
3.13× 63× (156− 1) = 30,564.45; under the null hypothesis this would have
the chi-squared distribution with 63(156− 1) = 9765 degrees of freedom, for
which the value 30,564.45 corresponds to a p-value of about exp(−4834.5)
which is completely negligible. So, the null hypothesis is definitively rejected.
However, we still feel that chisq (or, in particular, the related quantity V4) is
the most appropriate measure of writing-style variability in this case, even
though it no longer corresponds to an actual chi-squared distribution.
Remark. Of course, while a larger Vi value indicates that one justice
has a more variable writing style than another, it does not directly determine
whether the justice relies more heavily on law clerks. Alternative explana-
tions include that the justice edits his/her clerks work more carefully, or
that some clerks are better than others at copying their justice’s writing
style, or that some justices naturally have a more variable writing style even
when writing entirely on their own. So, we view the Vi measurements as one
window into the reliance of justices on their clerks, but not a completely
definitive one. This issue is considered further in the next section.
Remark. Values of chisq statistics can be less stable/useful when many
of the expected cell counts are very close to zero. Despite having already
eliminated from consideration those function words which have very low
frequency in the USSC judgments, and those USSC judgments which are
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Fig. 1. Expected (top) and observed (bottom) cell count frequencies for all 70,056 cells
corresponding to all 1112 of the USSC 1991–2009 judgments considered above.
extremely short, it is still true that in the judgments we consider, 4.48%
of the expected cell counts (mean 28.91, median 9.96) and 7.55% of the
observed cell counts (mean 28.91, median 10.00) are less than one (Figure
1). It may be possible to correct for this, for example, with Yates’ correction,
but this is not without difficulties, as it may over-correct and also is usually
used only for 2×2 tables. As a check, we experimented with recomputing our
V4 statistic omitting all cells with very small expected count, and found that
this slightly reduced all the V4 values but in a consistent way, and relevant
comparisons such as bootstrap tests of significance (see next section) were
virtually unchanged. So, overall we do not expect this small-cell issue to be
a significant problem, and we leave the definition of V4 as above.
3. Bootstrap test of significance. The question remains whether the re-
sults from the previous section (e.g., that Kennedy has larger writing vari-
ability than Scalia) are the result of mere chance or are actually illustrative of
different amounts of writing-style variability. Since we have already rejected
the null hypothesis (the null hypothesis that the function words are truly
distributed uniformly and randomly), the quantity V4 no longer follows a
chi-squared distribution, so no simple analytic test of statistical significance
is available.
So, to test significance, we perform a bootstrap test. Specifically, for each
justice we shall select cases a1, a2, . . . , a100 uniformly at random (with repe-
tition allowed, though this could also be done without repetition). For each
such choice of 100 cases, we shall compute the variability measure V4 as
above. We shall repeat this 1000 times for each justice, thus giving a list of
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1000 different possible values of V4, depending on which list of 100 cases was
randomly selected.
If we do this for two different justices, say, for Kennedy and for Scalia,
then this gives us 1000×1000 = 1,000,000 pairs of V4 values. We then simply
count the fraction of pairs under which the V4 for Kennedy is larger than the
V4 for Scalia, to give us an estimate of the probability that V4 for Kennedy is
larger than V4 for Scalia, for a randomly-chosen selection of their judgments.
We also use the pairs to estimate the distribution function for the difference
of the V4 variability for Kennedy, minus that for Scalia, and then use this
estimated distribution function to compute the 95% confidence interval for
the difference of V4 for Kennedy minus that for Scalia. If this confidence
interval is entirely positive, this indicates that Kennedy judgments have a
more variable writing style than Scalia judgments, and that this conclusion
is robust and statistically significant, rather than merely the result of chance
variation.
Note that this bootstrap setup has the additional advantage that, since
the same number of judgments (100) are chosen for each justice at each step,
any concerns about comparing different numbers of judgments are avoided.
3.1. Variability bootstrap results. We developed software [Rosenthal (2009)]
to compare the V4 bootstrap values as above, using 1000 bootstrap samples
each of size 100. We then ran this software to compare Kennedy and Scalia
in this manner, obtaining the following results:
mean(Kennedy) mean(Scalia) P(Kennedy > Scalia) 95% CI for Kennedy − Scalia
4.06 3.08 0.99996 (0.48, 1.51)
That is, this bootstrap test determines that the probability that a randomly-
selected sample of Kennedy’s writings is more variable than a randomly-
selected sample of Scalia’s writings is over 99.99%, a near certainty. Fur-
thermore, the 95% confidence interval (0.48, 1.51) for the difference in vari-
abilities is entirely positive. So, we can conclude with confidence that, based
on the V4 chi-squared test, Kennedy’s writings have more variable writing
style than Scalia’s.
Similarly, when comparing Souter to Scalia, we obtain the following:
mean(Souter) mean(Scalia) P(Souter > Scalia) 95% CI for Souter − Scalia
3.72 3.07 0.995 (0.15, 1.20)
Or, comparing Kennedy’s majority opinions to Kennedy’s dissents, we ob-
tain the following:
mean(majority) mean(dissent) P(majority > dissent) 95% CI for majority − dissent
4.06 2.44 1.00 (1.14, 2.13)
Or, comparing Scalia’s majority opinions to Scalia’s dissents, we obtain the
following:
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mean(majority) mean(dissent) P(majority > dissent) 95% CI for majority − dissent
3.08 2.43 0.9997 (0.29, 1.01)
Thus, we conclude with confidence that, as expected, both Kennedy’s and
Souter’s majority opinion writing are more variable than that of Scalia, and,
furthermore, Kennedy’s majority opinion writing is more variable than his
dissent opinion writing (and similarly for Scalia).
Similarly, we can compare other justices to Scalia, as follows:
mean(Stevens) mean(Scalia) P(Stevens > Scalia) 95% CI for Stevens − Scalia
3.86 3.08 0.998 (0.25, 1.34)
mean(Ginsburg) mean(Scalia) P(Ginsburg > Scalia) 95% CI for Ginsburg − Scalia
3.59 3.07 0.988 (0.07, 0.99)
mean(Thomas) mean(Scalia) P(Thomas > Scalia) 95% CI for Thomas − Scalia
3.48 3.08 0.972 (−0.01, 0.82)
Thus, we can conclude that in addition to Kennedy and Souter, each of
Stevens and Ginsburg also has greater writing variability than does Scalia,
while Thomas may have greater writing variability than does Scalia but that
assertion is not completely established. [The conclusion about Stevens may
be surprising, since Stevens also has a reputation for doing his own writing;
see Domnarski (1996), page 31. So, this result may indicate that Stevens
actually relied on clerks more than is generally believed, though of course
this evidence is not completely definitive.]
In the other direction, we conclude that in addition to Scalia, also Rehn-
quist, Breyer and Thomas each have statistically significantly less variability
than Kennedy, while Ginsburg does not:
95% CI for
mean(Kennedy) mean(Rehnquist) P(Kennedy > Rehnquist) Kennedy − Rehnquist
4.06 3.17 0.9998 (0.37, 1.43)
95% CI for
mean(Kennedy) mean(Breyer) P(Kennedy > Breyer) Kennedy − Breyer
4.05 3.25 0.995 (0.19, 1.42)
95% CI for
mean(Kennedy) mean(Thomas) P(Kennedy > Thomas) Kennedy − Thomas
4.06 3.48 0.981 (0.03, 1.15)
95% CI for
mean(Kennedy) mean(Ginsburg) P(Kennedy > Ginsburg) Kennedy − Ginsburg
4.06 3.57 0.948 (−0.10, 1.06)
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Table 3
Bootstrap results comparing the decades 1990s and 2000s
Justice mean(1990s) mean(2000s) P(1990s < 2000s) 95% CI for 2000s − 1990s
Kennedy 3.78 4.15 0.875 (−0.27, 0.96)
Scalia 2.96 3.08 0.753 (−0.25, 0.47)
Souter 3.73 3.49 0.189 (−0.79, 0.27)
Stevens 3.78 3.82 0.539 (−0.57, 0.66)
Breyer 3.37 3.05 0.138 (−0.86, 0.28)
Ginsburg 3.30 3.69 0.948 (−0.08, 0.86)
Thomas 3.36 3.47 0.701 (−0.29, 0.49)
Rehnquist 3.20 2.92 0.050 (−0.64, 0.06)
3.2. Within-justice comparisons. It is possible to use this same V4 boot-
strap approach to compare different collections of judgments by the same
justice.
For example, as justices age, their writings might get less variable (since
they develop a more consistent style) or more variable (if they come to rely
more on their law clerks). To test this, we perform V4 bootstrap tests, as
above, except now comparing a justice’s majority opinions from the 1990s
decade, to the same justice’s opinions from the 2000s decade. Our results
are in Table 3.
Looking at these results, there is no clear pattern. None of the decade
differences are statistically significant. Rehnquist is nearly significantly more
variable in the 1990s than the 2000s, and Ginsburg is nearly significantly
more variable in the 2000s than the 1990s, but since this does not conform to
any obvious interpretation or “story,” we are inclined to regard these slight
differences as mere chance events.
Another way to compare a justice’s writing is to look at those judgments
which were in the first half of a session (i.e., September through March)
versus those judgments in the second half (i.e., April through August). The
reason why judgments early in a session may appear different from those
later in a session is because law clerks rotate annually; thus, writing vari-
ability over the course of a session may increase if a given justice delegates
more work to his clerks, or may diminish if clerks better learn the prefer-
ences of their justice. That is, increasing variability may indicate a justice’s
increased trust, and therefore increased delegation or lower oversight to the
clerk; conversely, decreasing variability could reflect increased understanding
by the clerks of their justice’s preferred writing style.
Our results for this comparison are in Table 4.
This time, it appears that Kennedy, Souter and Rehnquist are somewhat
more variable in the second half of court sessions, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that they let their clerks write more opinions once they have
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Table 4
Bootstrap results comparing the first and second halves of court sessions
Justice mean(first) mean(second) P(first < second) 95% CI for second − first
Kennedy 3.68 4.25 0.964 (−0.05, 1.21)
Scalia 3.04 3.05 0.521 (−0.40, 0.41)
Souter 3.39 3.91 0.955 (−0.08, 1.08)
Stevens 4.04 3.61 0.094 (−1.07, 0.20)
Breyer 3.15 3.21 0.602 (−0.49, 0.59)
Ginsburg 3.57 3.47 0.340 (−0.55, 0.35)
Thomas 3.42 3.44 0.530 (−0.38, 0.41)
Rehnquist 3.01 3.28 0.935 (−0.08, 0.62)
more work experience. Meanwhile, Stevens leans slightly in the opposite
direction, with more variability in the first half of court sessions. However,
none of these results are statistically significant, so we refrain from drawing
clear conclusions from them.
4. Further investigation of the “V4” statistic. Since the “V4” quantity
is central to our conclusions about text variability and multiple authorship,
it seems appropriate to better understand the performance of this quantity
in other circumstances, as we do now.
4.1. Randomly-generated text. As a simple first experiment, we randomly
generated 200 pseudo-documents each consisting of 2000 independent ran-
domly generated words. (Specifically, each word was chosen to be a non-
function word with probability 70%, or uniformly selected from the list of
function words with probability 30%.) For such randomly-generated text,
the V4 statistic should approximately equal 1. In fact, we repeated this ex-
periment 10 times, obtaining a mean V4 value of 1.004622, with a standard
deviation of 0.01701969, consistent with having a true mean value of 1.
4.2. Historical trend. It is generally believed that USSC justices rely
more on their clerks in the modern era than they did in earlier times [Ward
and Weiden (2006); Peppers (2006)]. If so, and if larger V4 values are indeed
a good indicator of increased authorship, then V4 values should be generally
increasing with time.
To test this, we extended our software [Rosenthal (2009)] to also download
USSC cases from the Justia.com web site [Justia (2009)], and used this to
analyze cases from previous eras. We then computed the V4 score for all
cases, by all justices, on a decade-by-decade basis from 1850 onward (i.e.,
for all cases decided in 1850–1859, and for all cases decided in 1860–1869
and so on). The results, plotted against decade midpoint together with a
line of best fit, were as follows (Figure 2).
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Fig. 2. Decade-by-decade USSC judgment average V4 scores.
This graph shows that the V4 scores have a general trend upward, increas-
ing by just over 0.005 per decade (and this increase is statistically significant,
p= 0.0105). This upward trend is accelerated in the modern era (1950–2009)
to 0.020 per decade (p= 0.0087), corresponding to the period of increasing
clerk activity [Peppers (2006)]. These observations are consistent with the
supposition that V4 scores increase with increased delegation of authorship,
and that this delegation (through the greater reliance on law clerks) has
increased over the years.
4.3. Combining justices. Another way to test whether the V4 statistic
increases with multiple authorship is to combine various collections of judg-
ments together in ways which would appear to increase the total number of
authors, and see if the V4 scores rise. We select judgments that we believe to
be homogeneous in their authorship, namely, majority judgments of Scalia,
Rehnquist and Breyer, and dissenting judgments of Scalia and Kennedy. Our
results are in Table 5.
This table shows that, while the effect is not overwhelming, nevertheless,
there is a modest increase in the values of V4 when two or three different jus-
tices (each believed to author their own judgments) are combined together,
as compared to the V4 scores for individual justices. (Furthermore, this effect
appears to be reasonably robust to subselection. For example, we divided
the Rehnquist and Breyer opinions into two subcollections and measured
the V4 score for the four possible pairings, obtaining values of 3.37, 3.43,
3.52 and 3.60, all significantly more than the individual V4 scores of 3.13
and 3.22.) Thus, we believe that this provides modest further support for
the hypothesis that increased V4 scores corresponding to additional authors.
4.4. Essays of known authorship. Yet another way to test whether the V4
statistic increases with multiple authorship is to take documents of known
authorship outside the judicial realm (where clerks are not a factor) and
combine them in different ways.
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Table 5
Variability statistics when combining different justices
together
# judgments V4
Scalia 156 3.13
Rehnquist 127 3.22
Breyer 121 3.31
Scalia + Rehnquist 283 3.29
Scalia + Breyer 277 3.44
Rehnquist + Breyer 248 3.49
Scalia + Rehnquist + Breyer 404 3.46
Scalia dissent 108 2.46
Kennedy dissent 42 2.51
Scalia dissent + Kennedy dissent 150 2.56
We considered the following historical essays: Walden by H. D. Thoreau
(hereafter “Walden”); The Communist Manifesto by K. Marx and F. Engels,
in English translation (“Manifest”); On the Origin of Species by C. Darwin
(“Species”); and On Liberty by J. S. Mill (“Liberty”). We divided Walden
and Liberty into discrete 2000-word chunks (discarding any leftover words),
divided Manifest into discrete 1000-word chunks (since it is shorter), and
left Species as the 15 separate chapters in which it was written. We then
tried combining them in different ways. Our results are in Table 6.
Table 6
Variability statistics when combining different essays
together
# units V4
Liberty 23 1.799
Manifest 17 1.814
Walden 57 2.255
Species 16 2.999
Liberty + Manifest 40 2.412
Liberty + Walden 80 2.595
Liberty + Species 39 3.830
Manifest + Walden 74 2.548
Manifest + Species 33 3.152
Walden + Species 73 3.793
Liberty + Manifest + Walden 97 2.737
Liberty + Manifest + Walden + Species 113 3.580
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Table 7
Variability statistics when combining different essays
together and subsampling
# units V4
Liberty9 9 1.717
Manifest9 9 1.735
Walden9 9 1.760
Species9 9 3.240
Liberty9 + Manifest9 18 2.388
Liberty9 + Walden9 18 2.133
Liberty9 + Species9 18 3.873
Manifest9 + Walden9 18 2.568
Manifest9 + Species9 18 3.262
Walden9 + Species9 18 3.847
Once again, we see clear evidence that combining multiple authors leads
to larger V4 scores, consistent with the hypothesis that larger V4 scores
indicate additional authors. Indeed, in every case, the combined V4 is larger
than any of the individual V4 scores.
Again, this finding is fairly robust to subsampling. For example, consider-
ing just units #1–9 of each collection (denoted by “9”), we obtain in Table 7.
Even with this subsampling, the combined collections always have larger
V4 scores than the individual collections, usually substantially so. Also, the
results for the subsampled collections are generally quite similar to the cor-
responding results for the full collections (though Walden9 is rather less
variable than Walden for some reason), thus confirming that V4 is largely
unaffected by the size of a collection but rather concentrates on the writing
variability itself.
4.5. Fictional novels. For completeness, we also consider some famous
historical fictional novels (www.gutenberg.org), namely: Oliver Twist, by C.
Dickens (hereafter “Oliver”), The Three Musketeers by A. Dumas (“Three”),
Pride and Prejudice by J. Austen (“Pride”), A Study in Scarlet by A. C.
Doyle (“Scarlet”), and Alice in Wonderland by L. Caroll (“Alice”). Each
novel was chopped into 2000-word units (again discarding any leftover).
The results are in Table 8.
Once again, the V4 scores for the combined collections are larger than
the individual V4 scores (with one exception: Oliver + Scarlet), sometimes
substantially so. Of course, it could be argued that fictional writing is more
free-form and thus has different stylometric properties from such serious and
formal writing as USSC judgments. Nevertheless, these results do provide
some sort of further support to the hypothesis that larger V4 scores indicate
additional authors.
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Table 8
Variability statistics when combining different
fictional novels together
# units V4
Pride 60 1.730
Alice 13 1.815
Oliver 78 1.847
Scarlet 21 2.041
Three 114 2.058
Pride + Alice 73 2.233
Pride + Oliver 138 2.326
Pride + Scarlet 81 2.160
Pride + Three 174 2.310
Alice + Oliver 91 2.025
Alice + Scarlet 34 2.388
Alice + Three 127 2.306
Oliver + Scarlet 99 1.949
Oliver + Three 192 2.191
Scarlet + Three 135 2.179
In the interests of fair reporting, we note that we also experimented briefly
with the novel War and Peace by L. Tolstoy, broken up into 281 different
2000-word chunks. We found that this collection had a surprisingly high V4
score, 2.675, which did not significantly increase (in fact, it sometimes even
decreased) when combined with other collections. So, these results went
against the hypothesis that additional authors always leads to larger V4
scores, perhaps due to the unusually high variability of this novel itself.
Despite this caveat, overall we feel that the results of this section provide
modest additional support for the use of the V4 statistic when considering
issues of multiple authorship.
5. Authorship identification. A related question is whether it is possible
to identify which justice is the (recorded) author of a judgment, based only
on the writing style. We posed this question to a small number of USSC
constitutional scholars. The consensus was that while they could perhaps
identify authorship based on the case name or known passages, they could
not do so by writing style alone. We now consider the extent to which this
identification can be done by appropriate computer algorithms. This ques-
tion is thus similar in spirit to the Shakespeare authorship question [Selet-
sky, Huang and Henderson-Frost (2007); Burns (2006); Wikipedia (2009)],
and also to the Federalist Papers authorship question [Mosteller and Wal-
lace (1964)] and the Reagan radio address analysis [Airoldi et al. (2006);
Airoldi, Fienberg and Skinner (2007)]. Of course, there is one important dif-
ference here: in most instances the recorded authorship of USSC judgments
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is known. However, we still view this as a useful test of the extent to which
different USSC justices have identifiably distinct writing styles.
We shall consider both naive Bayes classifiers and linear classifiers, and
shall see that each performs quite well at this task, achieving success rates as
high as 90%. (Other possible approaches include neural networks, support
vector machines, etc., but for simplicity we do not consider them here.)
In each case, we shall consider a particular pair of justices (say, Justices
A and B). We shall consider the collection of all USSC judgments whose
recorded author is either A or B, and shall partition this collection into a
disjoint training set and testing set. Using only the training set, we develop
a model for classifying judgments as being authored by A or B. We then
test to see if our model classifies authorship correctly on the testing set.
5.1. Naive Bayes classifier. We begin with a naive Bayes classifier. More
specifically, we assume that conditioned on the recorded author being Justice
A, the conditional distribution of the fraction fj of function word j appearing
in the judgment is normally distributed. (Of course, the normal distribution
is not the only choice here, and the “true” distribution is presumably a
rather complicated mixture, over the total number of words, of multinomial
distributions normalized by the total number of words in each judgment. But
the normal distribution appears to be a good enough approximation for our
purposes.) We further assume that the corresponding mean and variance are
given by the sample mean and variance of all judgments by Justice A in the
training set. In addition, we assume (since we are being “naive”) that these
different fractions fj (over different function words j) are all conditionally
independent.
Together with the uniform prior distribution on whether the author is
Justice A or B, this gives the log-likelihood for a given judgment being
authored by Justice A, namely,
loglike(A) =C −
63∑
j=1
(
1
2
log(vj) + (fj −mj)
2/2vj
)
(1)
for some constant C, where fj is the fraction of words which are reference
word j in the test judgment under consideration, and where mj and vj are
the sample mean and variance of the fraction of words which are reference
word j, over all judgments in the training set authored by A.
Similarly, we can compute loglike(B). The model then classifies the test
judgment as being authored by A if loglike(A) > loglike(B), otherwise it
classifies it as being authored by B.
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5.2. Linear classifier. Another approach is a linear classifier. Specifi-
cally, let T be a training set consisting of various judgments by A or B,
with |T |= n. We consider the linear regression model
Y = xβ + ε,
where ε is an n× 1 vector of independent zero-mean errors. Here Y is an
n× 1 vector of ±1, which equals −1 for each judgment in the training set
authored by A, or +1 for each judgment in the training set authored by B.
Also, x is the n× 64 matrix given by
x=


1 f1,1 f1,2 . . . f1,63
1 f2,1 f2,2 . . . f2,63
...
...
...
...
1 fn,1 fn,2 . . . fn,63

 ,
where fi,j is the fraction of words in judgment i (in the training set) which
are function word j. For this model, the usual least-squares estimate for β
(which corresponds to the MLE if the εi are assumed to be iid normal) is
given by
βˆ = (xTx)−1xTY.
Once we have this estimate βˆ = (βˆ0, βˆ1, . . . , βˆn), then given a fresh test
judgment having function word fractions g1, g2, . . . , g63, we can compute the
linear fit value
ℓ= βˆ0 +
63∑
j=1
βˆjgj .
Then, if ℓ < 0, we classify the test judgment as being authored by A, other-
wise we classify it as being authored by B.
Below we shall consider both the linear classifier and the naive Bayes clas-
sifier. We shall see that, generally speaking, the linear classifier outperforms
the naive Bayes classifier, sometimes significantly so.
5.3. Testing accuracy via cross-validation. To test the accuracy of our
model, we use leave-one-out cross-validation. That is, for each judgment by
either A or B, we consider that one judgment be the test set, with all other
judgments by either A or B comprising the training set. We then see whether
or not our model classifies the test judgment correctly. Finally, we count the
number of correct classifications, separately over all judgments by A, and
over all judgments by B.
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Table 9
Authorship identification results using the naive Bayes classifier
Justice A Justice B success(A) success(B)
Scalia Kennedy 133/156 = 0.853 129/147 = 0.878
Scalia Souter 132/156 = 0.846 119/143 = 0.832
Scalia Stevens 130/156 = 0.833 120/148 = 0.811
Scalia Rehnquist 139/156 = 0.891 101/127 = 0.795
Kennedy Souter 139/147 = 0.946 121/143 = 0.846
Kennedy Stevens 122/147 = 0.830 113/148 = 0.764
Kennedy Rehnquist 124/147 = 0.844 97/127 = 0.764
Souter Stevens 118/143 = 0.825 124/148 = 0.838
Rehnquist Breyer 111/127 = 0.874 105/121 = 0.868
Rehnquist Stevens 76/127 = 0.598 113/148 = 0.764
Rehnquist Thomas 76/127 = 0.598 94/140 = 0.671
Scalia Scalia dissent 140/156 = 0.897 72/108 = 0.667
Stevens Stevens dissent 122/148 = 0.824 124/205 = 0.605
Scalia Stevens dissent 141/156 = 0.904 118/205 = 0.576
5.3.1. Results: Naive Bayes classifier. We ran software [Rosenthal (2009)]
to perform the cross-validation test using the naive Bayes classifier, for var-
ious pairs of justices A and B. Our results are in Table 9.
We see from these results that our naive Bayes classifier performs fairly
well on majority opinions, often achieving a success rate over 80%. (This is
fairly consistent across all pairings, not just those shown in Table 9; in partic-
ular, the success rate for majority opinions is over 70% for all 8×7
2
= 28 pos-
sible pairings except for five: Scalia–Thomas, Souter–Stevens, Rehnquist–
Stevens, Stevens–Thomas and Rehnquist–Thomas.) This appears to be quite
a good performance, especially considering the minimal assumptions that
have gone into the model. (Presumably a more sophisticated model could
achieve even higher success rate.) So, we see this as evidence that USSC
judgment authors can indeed be distinguished by their writing style, in fact
just by the pattern of fractions of function words used.
We also note that there is some variability concerning which justices’
writing styles are most easily distinguished. For example, Rehnquist and
Breyer are apparently relatively easy to distinguish from one another, while
Rehnquist and Thomas are rather more difficult.
The algorithm does not perform as well on the dissenting opinions, pre-
sumably because they tend to be shorter and thus less clearly representative
of their author’s writing style. In fact, when comparing dissent to majority
opinions, the algorithm tends to classify too many judgments as being from
the majority collection, and this weakness remains whether the majority and
minority collections are from the same justice or from two different justices.
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Fig. 3. Simple illustrative likelihood functions for hypothetical justices A (solid line) and
B (dashed line), for which about 70% of judgments would be classified as A’s regardless of
which distribution they came from.
Remark. Our results above show some asymmetries, for example, there
is much greater success distinguishing Stevens’ opinions from Rehnquist’s
(0.764) than vice-versa (0.598). This may seem counterintuitive but it pro-
vides no contradiction. For a simple illustration, if there were just one func-
tion word, and A’s function word distribution had mean 5 and standard
deviation 1, while B’s function word distribution had mean 5 and standard
deviation 1.1, then A’s likelihood function would usually be above B’s (Fig-
ure 3), and about 70% of opinions would be classified as A’s regardless of
which distribution they came from.
5.3.2. Results: Linear classifier. We also ran software [Rosenthal (2009)]
to perform the cross-validation test using a linear classifier, again for various
pairs of justices A and B. Our results are in Table 10.
Comparing these results with those from the previous subsection shows
that the linear classifier performs even better than the naive Bayes classifier,
with success rates often close to 90%. (This is again fairly consistent across
all pairings; in particular, the success rate is above 80% for all possible
majority opinion pairings with the exception of Rehnquist–Stevens and those
involving Thomas.) This provides further, even stronger evidence that it is
indeed possible to distinguish between different USSC justices’ judgments
solely on the basis of writing style.
Once again, there is some variability concerning which justices’ writing
styles are most easily distinguished. For example, success rates for distin-
guishing Rehnquist from Breyer are over 90%, while those for distinguishing
Rehnquist and Thomas are in the 60s.
On dissenting opinions, the linear classifier appears to be less prone to in-
correctly classifying almost all judgments as being from the majority opinion
collection. Rather, it is better balanced between the two collections. How-
ever, it still finds the dissenting opinions to be challenging, with success
rates ranging from 84% (quite good) down to 67% (rather poor).
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Remark. It is possible to examine the regression coefficients to see
which words are most used to distinguish justices. For example, when com-
paring Kennedy to Scalia, the regression coefficient for the function word
now is −540, while that for such is +204. And, indeed, Kennedy’s judg-
ments use now over twice as frequently as Scalia’s, but use such less than
half as frequently.
5.4. Outlier detection. Finally, we briefly note that the above naive Bayes
approach can easily be adapted to the issue of outlier detection. Suppose a
collection of n judgments is given, and it is believed that they were all writ-
ten by the same author with one exception (e.g., perhaps a justice allowed his
clerks to write just one of his opinions each term, something we may explore
more fully in separate work). That is, there are n − 1 “decoy” judgments
all written by the same author, plus one unknown “test” judgment having
different authorship. In this case, for each individual judgment, we proceed
by excluding that judgment, computing sample means mj and variances vj
for each reference word j based on the other n − 1 judgments, and then
computing a log-likelihood for the individual judgment as in (1). The higher
this log-likelihood value, the better the individual judgment “fits in” with all
the other judgments. We can then rank all the individual judgments from 1
to n in terms of their log-likelihood scores, from smallest log-likelihood (i.e.,
most likely to be the outlier) to largest log-likelihood (i.e., least likely to be
the outlier).
To score the performance of such outlier detection, suppose our algorithm
gives the true outlier a rank of i. If i = 1, the algorithm has performed
Table 10
Authorship identification results using the linear classifier
Justice A Justice B success(A) success(B)
Scalia Kennedy 135/156 = 0.865 135/147 = 0.918
Scalia Souter 137/156 = 0.878 123/143 = 0.860
Scalia Stevens 125/156 = 0.801 126/148 = 0.851
Scalia Rehnquist 137/156 = 0.878 108/127 = 0.850
Kennedy Souter 138/147 = 0.939 132/143 = 0.923
Kennedy Stevens 135/147 = 0.918 128/148 = 0.865
Kennedy Rehnquist 133/147 = 0.905 110/127 = 0.866
Souter Stevens 122/143 = 0.853 131/148 = 0.885
Rehnquist Breyer 121/127 = 0.953 110/121 = 0.909
Rehnquist Stevens 88/127 = 0.693 118/148 = 0.797
Rehnquist Thomas 77/127 = 0.606 92/140 = 0.657
Scalia Scalia dissent 131/156 = 0.840 77/108 = 0.713
Stevens Stevens dissent 99/148 = 0.669 151/205 = 0.737
Scalia Stevens dissent 125/156 = 0.801 164/205 = 0.800
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perfectly, while if i = n, then the algorithm has completely failed. So, we
can convert this to a score from 0 (worst) to 100 (best), by the simple linear
transformation
score =
n− i
n− 1
× 100.(2)
To test this algorithm, we averaged the score (2) over a collection of test
judgments, to compute a final average score between 0 (worst) and 100
(best). We used the following collections: Scalia’s 156 judgments considered
herein; Kennedy’s 147 judgments considered herein; Rehnquist’s 127 judg-
ments considered herein; the 24 judgments from Volume 8 (1807–1808) of
the USSC (obtained by extending our software [Rosenthal (2009)] to down-
load older USSC judgments from the Justia (2009) web site); and the 114
segments of The Three Musketeers (“Three”) as discussed in Section 4.5.
Our results are in Table 11.
We see that the algorithm can very easily distinguish the fictional work
The Three Musketeers from such serious writings as Scalia’s USSC judg-
ments. Furthermore, it can easily pick out an old Volume 8 judgments from
a sea of modern Scalia judgments. Interestingly, this last result is highly
asymmetric (even more so than that suggested by Figure 3), that is, the al-
gorithm is much worse at picking out a single Scalia judgment from a sea of
Volume 8 judgments. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the algorithm has less success
picking out a single Scalia judgment from a sea of Kennedy judgments, or
vice versa. Indeed, its scores, near 65, are only moderately better than pure
chance guessing (which would produce an average score of 50). For Scalia
versus Rehnquist—two justices who apparently write their own opinions—
the scores are not much better. This illustrates that it is easier to identify
judgment authorship when given two large collections, than when given a
single large collection with just one outlier.
Table 11
Outlier detection results
Test collection Decoy collection Average score
Scalia Three 99.44
Three Scalia 99.87
Scalia Volume 8 58.55
Volume 8 Scalia 99.71
Scalia Kennedy 64.41
Kennedy Scalia 65.72
Scalia Rehnquist 57.75
Rehnquist Scalia 71.11
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6. Summary. In this paper we have presented methodology and soft-
ware for investigations of USSC judgments by using statistical properties of
function words.
First, we have investigated the variability of writing style over various col-
lections of judgments, in particular, of majority decisions written by different
justices. We have seen that it is possible to uncover statistically significant
evidence that one USSC justice (e.g., Kennedy) has greater writing-style
variability than another justice (e.g., Scalia), which may indicate that the
first justice relies on law clerk assistance to a greater extent than does the
second justice.
Second, we have investigated the extent to which unknown authorship of
USSC judgments can be determined based solely on function word statis-
tics. We have seen that both naive Bayes classifiers and linear classifiers
perform fairly well at this task, achieving cross-validation success rates ap-
proaching 90%. While authorship is typically known for all USSC opinions,
our approach reveals that justices—even with contributions by clerks—have
writing styles which are distinguishable from one another. (In a different
direction, one could perhaps use function words to identify authorship for
the handful of per curiam decisions in which the Court does not reveal
authorship, though we do not pursue that here.)
Of course, our approach—or any textual analysis—can provide only cir-
cumstantial evidence of collaborative authorship, not definitive proof. A low
V4 score can reflect that a justice does her own writing, that the justice
closely edits her clerks’ work, or that the clerks are all highly effective at
mimicking their justices’ writing style; these states of the world are obser-
vationally equivalent. However, we do believe that our results provide com-
pelling evidence that justices over time are indeed relying more on their law
clerks, and that justices vary considerably from one another in this regard.
Overall, we hope that the methodology and software [Rosenthal (2009)]
presented here will provide useful insights into USSC writings, as well as a
helpful starting point for other statistical investigations into other bodies of
writing in other contexts.
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